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HIGH-TECH HARASSMENT: EMPLOYER LIABILITY
UNDER TITLE VII FOR EMPLOYEE SOCIAL MEDIA
MISCONDUCT
Jeremy Gelms
Abstract: Workplace harassment has traditionally occurred within the “four walls” of the
workplace. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that employers are liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act for harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee’s
work environment. The rise in social media, however, has created a new medium through
which harassment occurs. Courts are just beginning to confront the issue of if and when to
consider social media harassment as part of the totality of the circumstances of a Title VII
hostile work environment claim. This Comment argues that to determine whether social
media harassment evidence should be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances,
courts should examine whether the employer derived a “substantial benefit” from the social
media forum. If the employer derived a “substantial benefit” from the social media forum
where the harassment occurred, then a court may logically consider the social media platform
to be an extension of the employee’s work environment and thus part of the totality of the
circumstances. This framework is consistent with the traditional workplace harassment
analysis under Title VII, recognizes evolving technology in the modern workplace, and
would provide employers with guidance on how to maintain an affirmative defense to
harassment allegations in the social media age.

INTRODUCTION
Since 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized workplace
harassment as an actionable claim against an employer under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Traditionally, harassment has occurred
through face-to-face verbal and physical acts in the workplace.2 The
traditional notion of the workplace, however, continues to expand with
changing technology and flexible schedules, which increasingly allow
employees to stay connected to the work environment at numerous
locations outside the physical boundaries of the office.3 In particular, the
1. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986) (finding that workplace harassment
based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is actionable under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
2. See id. at 65–66.
3. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
283, 293 (2003) (commenting that untraditional working arrangements continue to expand and that
“the growth in telecommuting appears to be continuing in the new millennium”); see also Joan T.A.
Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the Employment
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rise of social media has given employers and employees new means
through which to interact with customers, colleagues, friends, and
acquaintances outside the workplace.4 These same technological
developments have also expanded the media through which individuals
may perpetrate acts of harassment.5 With the rise in popularity of social
media, harassment has moved beyond the physical walls of the
workplace to the virtual workplace.6
The broadening conception of the workplace and increasing use of
social media in professional settings expands potential employer liability
under Title VII.7 In order for workplace harassment to be actionable
under Title VII, courts have traditionally required plaintiffs to show that
the harassment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” under the totality
of the circumstances to “alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.”8 This is known as a hostile
work environment claim. Courts have split over what type of evidence to
consider under the totality of the circumstances analysis9 and they are
just beginning to address claims of harassment conducted via social
media.10 However, those courts that have addressed the issue have
indicated that evidence of social media harassment should be included as
part of the totality of the circumstances.11
Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 302 (2003) (noting
that the number of people working from home continues to grow).
4. Rafael Gely, Social Isolation and American Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Reform,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 301–03 (2007) (discussing how employees are increasingly turning to
the internet, and in particular blogs, to interact with other employees or talk about work); see also
Nick Clayton, Business Joins the Party, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576244622146113118.html (discussing
social media’s rise in popularity among businesses).
5. See David K. McGraw, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of
Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 491, 491–92 (1995) (discussing how the
growth of computer networks in the 1980s and 1990s created a new form of communication that
allows for widespread sexual harassment).
6. See id. at 494–96 (discussing the various means through which online harassment can occur).
7. See Douglas R. Garmager, Comment, Discrimination Outside of the Office: Where to Draw the
Walls of the Workplace for a “Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1075, 1092–100 (2010) (arguing that employers should be liable for harassment conducted
outside the office). But see Alisha Patterson, Comment, None of Your Business: Barring Evidence of
Non-Workplace Harassment for Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
237, 257–68 (2010) (arguing that employers should not be liable for employee harassment outside
the office).
8. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. Id.
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This Comment argues that courts examining employer liability for
harassment via social media should not abandon the traditional totality
of the circumstances model but should recognize the changes wrought
by evolving technology in the workplace. To determine employer
liability, courts should consider whether the employer derived a
“substantial benefit” from the social media through which the
harassment occurred. If the employer derived a “substantial benefit”
from the social media then the court may properly view the harassment
as part of the employee’s work environment and consider it as part of the
totality of the circumstances for purposes of a hostile work environment
claim.
This Comment begins by providing background on Title VII
workplace harassment law and outlining the traditional basis of
employer liability. Part II examines courts’ recognition of the expanding
concept of the workplace and their acknowledgment that evidence of
harassment outside the traditional walls of the workplace should be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances of a hostile work
environment claim. Part III discusses the use of social media by
individuals and businesses. Part IV addresses an employer’s potential
liability for harassment that occurs via social media. Finally, Part V
provides a framework for courts to examine employer liability for
harassment that occurs through social media. It argues that courts should
consider evidence of harassment over social media as part of the totality
of the circumstances of a hostile work environment claim when the
employer derives a substantial benefit from the social media at issue.
I.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS RECOGNIZED EMPLOYER
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT THAT CREATES A HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.”12 Initially, courts held that Title VII’s
proscription only created a private right of action for disparate treatment
claims, such as claims by qualified applicants denied employment
because of their race or gender.13 It was not until 1986, in Meritor
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
13. See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715–18 (1978)
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Savings Bank v. Vinson,14 that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
workplace harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII.15
In Meritor, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that workplace
harassment is actionable against an employer under Title VII if the
harassment is sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter the employee’s
work conditions.16 This became known as a hostile work environment
claim.17 In Meritor, a bank employee alleged that, over a period of four
years, the vice president of the bank sexually harassed her on numerous
occasions and eventually raped her.18 Broadly interpreting Title VII, the
Court found that “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women.’”19 In other words,
the Court held that Title VII was intended to cover not only economic
barriers, but psychological and physical injuries as well.20 On the other
hand, Title VII is not “a general civility code” that makes conduct illegal
simply because it is uncomfortable or inappropriate.21 Thus, in order for
workplace harassment to be actionable as a hostile work environment
claim “it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”22 The Court’s opinion, while establishing that a hostile
work environment is actionable under Title VII, left unanswered what
qualifies as “severe or pervasive” harassment giving rise to employer
liability.

(holding that requiring women to contribute more money to pension fund than male employees is
discrimination because of sex); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971) (holding that overlooking female applicants because they are married, but imposing no
similar marital restriction on men, is discrimination because of sex).
14. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
15. Id. at 67. In 1976, the first federal court recognized sexual harassment as unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title VII. Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
16. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
17. Id. at 65 (coining term “hostile work environment” in sexual discrimination cases).
18. Id. at 59–61.
19. Id. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
20. Id. at 64.
21. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)) (acknowledging that the harassment must also be unwelcomed).
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Harassment in a Hostile Work Environment Claim Must Be
“Severe or Pervasive” Under the Totality of the Circumstances

Seven years after Meritor, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,23 the
U.S. Supreme Court defined what constitutes sufficiently “severe or
pervasive” harassment to support a hostile work environment claim.
Theresa Harris, a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., claimed that she was
repeatedly subjected to unwanted sexual comments and innuendos by
the company president, to the point where she was forced to quit her
job.24 In reviewing Harris’s hostile work environment claim, the Court
first established that, in order to meet the “severe and pervasive”
requirement, the plaintiff must show that the work environment is hostile
or abusive under both an objective and subjective standard.25 In other
words, the plaintiff must show not only that he or she personally
perceived the work environment to be hostile or abusive, but also that a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would perceive the
environment to be hostile.26
In lieu of a bright-line test based on a single dispositive factor, the
Court stated that the fact-finder must look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the conduct was sufficiently “severe
or pervasive” as to create a hostile work environment under the objective
prong of the analysis.27 The Court identified several relevant factors,
including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.”28 The more severe the harassment is,
the less pervasive it needs to be, and vice versa.29 Accordingly, a single
incident of harassment will generally not create a hostile work
environment unless the harassment is quite severe.30 Notably, the Court
made no reference to the location or timing of the discriminatory
conduct.
23. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
24. Id. at 19–20.
25. Id. at 21–22.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 23.
29. See id.
30. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“‘[S]imple teasing,’ offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998))).
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Agency Principles Govern Employer Liability for a Hostile Work
Environment

Although Meritor and Harris helped clarify how a plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case of harassment, these cases left unresolved
the contours of employer liability for a hostile work environment under
Title VII. While Meritor suggested that employer liability should be
determined according to common-law agency principles, the Court did
not fully address the issue.31 After Meritor, lower courts followed the
Court’s recommendation and used the Restatement (Second) of Agency
as a guide.32 The Restatement, however, suggests several different bases
for employer liability.33 Not surprisingly, lower courts adopted
competing agency standards to determine employer liability for
supervisor harassment: some imposed vicarious or automatic liability,
while others imposed a negligence standard.34
Finally, in 1998, in the companion cases Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton35 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth36 the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the standard for employer liability for workplace
harassment. In Faragher, the plaintiff alleged that the City of Boca
Raton was liable for creating a hostile work environment because,
during her time as a lifeguard for the city, her supervisor repeatedly
subjected her to uninvited and offensive touching, lewd remarks, and
derogatory gender-based terms.37 Likewise, in Ellerth, the plaintiff
31. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
32. See, e.g., Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1996) (“This court . . . has
looked to traditional agency principles . . . to determine employer liability under Title VII.”); Sparks
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n determining whether a
supervisor was acting as an ‘agent’ for Title VII purposes, courts must look for guidance to common
law agency principles.”); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing Meritor directed courts to look to common law agency principles for guidance in
determining liability for supervisor harassment).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957) (“A master is not subject to
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: (a) the
master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or reckless, or (c)
the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”).
34. Compare, e.g., Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
“employer is held strictly liable for its employee’s unlawful acts”), with Bouton v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding employer liable for sexual harassment only if it
“knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action”).
35. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
36. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
37. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
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alleged that her employer was liable for her supervisor’s alleged
offensive gestures and touching, including the supervisor’s threat that he
could make the plaintiff’s life very difficult at the company if she
rebuffed his sexual advances.38
In both cases, the Court reiterated that agency principles inform the
standard for employer liability39 and noted that the standard for
employer liability depends on whether a supervisor or a non-supervisor
employee perpetrated the harassment.40 The Court ultimately ruled that
when a supervisor causes workplace harassment, an employer is strictly
liable if the harassment results in a tangible employment action.41 Even
when supervisor harassment does not result in a tangible employment
action, however, employers are still presumptively liable if the
harassment creates a hostile work environment.42 On the other hand,
when a non-supervisor perpetrates the harassment and creates a hostile
work environment, employers are held only to a negligence standard.43
1.

Employers Are Vicariously Liable for Harassment by Supervisors
that Results in a Tangible Employment Action

The Court in Faragher and Ellerth, after rejecting the scope of
employment and apparent authority rationales, settled on the aided-inagency principle articulated in section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency as the appropriate starting point for determining
employer liability for harassment conducted by supervisors.44 Under this
principle, “[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their employment unless . . . he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.”45 The Court reasoned that a tangible employment action, by its
very nature, involves an action that the supervisor could not have
accomplished without the agency relationship.46 A tangible employment
action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
38. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48.
39. Id. at 754–55; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–804.
40. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761–62; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802–04.
41. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
42. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
43. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that federal courts have “uniformly judg[ed] employer
liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard”); see also infra Part I.B.3.
44. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957) (emphasis added).
46. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761–62 (noting that the actions of the supervisor are often
documented on official company records and are typically reviewed by higher level supervisors).
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firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”47
Tangible employment actions are the means through which a
harassing supervisor “brings the official power of the enterprise to bear
on subordinates” and requires an official act of the employer.48 Thus,
from the employee’s perspective, the supervisor and the employer are
indistinguishable.49 According to the Court, “[w]hatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements
will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment
action against a subordinate.”50 Therefore, when a supervisor perpetrates
harassment that results in a tangible employment action, the employer is
vicariously liable.
2.

Employers Are Presumptively Liable for Harassment by
Supervisors that Results in a Hostile Work Environment

Absent a tangible employment action, the employer is still presumed
liable if the supervisor’s harassment creates a hostile work
environment.51 The Court reasoned that the aided-in-agency principle is
still relevant because in order to create a hostile work environment the
supervisor “necessarily draw[s] upon his superior position over the
people who report to him.”52 In most instances, because a supervisor has
the power to make economic decisions that impact the victim, victims
are deterred from reporting harassing conduct.53 Thus, the supervisor’s
harassing actions are aided by the power a supervisor holds within the
employment relationship.54 Additionally, the supervisor can be aided via
an employer’s actions or inactions that facilitate an environment where
harassing conduct can occur.55 Absent a tangible employment action, an
employer can refute the presumption of liability by raising an affirmative
defense.56
To raise the affirmative defense, the employer must show that (1) it

47. Id. at 761.
48. Id. at 762.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 762–63.
51. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
52. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801–03.
56. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any
harassment; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to otherwise avoid harm.57 The first prong generally requires an
employer to establish, disseminate, and implement an anti-harassment
policy and complaint procedure and to take reasonable steps to prevent
and correct harassment.58 However, even the best policy will not
constitute reasonable care if the employer failed to implement it
effectively.59 On the other hand, the lack of a formal policy will not
necessarily defeat the employer’s defense if the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent harassment through other means.60 The
second prong requires the employer to show that the employee failed to
utilize the anti-harassment procedures the employer had in place.61 By
providing for a judicially created affirmative defense, the Court limited
employers’ potential liability and gave employers an incentive to take
proactive measures against harassment.62
3.

Employers Are Liable for Harassment Conducted by NonSupervisors Under a Negligence Standard

The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed employer
liability for non-supervisor harassment;63 however, lower courts have
57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
58. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
59. Compare Gentry v. Exp. Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842, 848 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding sexual
harassment policy insufficient where policy was not posted and reasonable person would not know
how to report harassment), and Derijk v. Southland Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174–75 (D. Utah
2003) (finding employer did not exercise reasonable care where no employees received training
about harassment policy and employer did not follow up on complaints), with Jackson v. Cnty. of
Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 501 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding county exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct harassing behavior where it had a comprehensive anti-harassment policy, posted it in every
department, and had a Human Resources Department that responded promptly to every complaint),
and Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding employer took
reasonable precaution where employer had policy against sexual harassment, subordinate admitted
attending orientation on company’s sexual harassment policies, conceded she saw posters regarding
workplace harassment, and employer immediately began investigation), and Montero v. Agco
Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding first prong of affirmative defense established
where employer had an anti-harassment policy, employee received the policy, and the employer
promptly investigated complaint).
60. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 805–06 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975))
(discussing that the primary purpose of Title VII is not to provide a remedy but to prevent harm
from occurring in the first place).
63. Without issuing a holding on the issue of employer liability for harassment by co-workers, the
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recognized that a hostile work environment can be created not only by
supervisors, but also by co-workers64 and third-party non-employees.65
These decisions acknowledge that a hostile work environment claim
need not stem from a power disparity.66 In situations where a nonsupervisor perpetrates the harassment, courts unanimously impose
liability for employers under a negligence standard.67 Under this
standard, an employer is liable if the employer “knew, or upon
reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”68 The more
restrictive scope of employer liability for harassment by non-supervisors
demonstrates that courts focus on the extent to which the employment
relationship facilitated the harassing conduct when determining whether
to impose liability on the employer.
II.

COURTS HAVE STRUGGLED TO DETERMINE THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORKPLACE AND HAVE REACHED
DIVERGENT RESULTS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT CONDUCTED
OFF WORK PREMISES

The text and legislative history of Title VII provide little guidance for
determining whether conduct outside the workplace is part of the totality
of the circumstances in a hostile work environment suit,69 and the U.S.
Court in Faragher noted that the trend among federal courts is to impose liability under a
negligence standard for a hostile work environment created by a nonsupervisory coworker. See id.
at 799.
64. See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting Faragher did
not disturb the negligence standard governing employer liability for co-worker harassment);
Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242, 246 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer can be
directly and indirectly liable for the harassment of an employee by another co-worker).
65. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073–74 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
employer could be held liable for sexual harassment caused by customers under a negligence
theory); see also Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer Is Always Right . . . Not! Employer Liability for
Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2002) (arguing that third party
harassment is a prevalent form of harassment that is not adequately and enthusiastically pursued by
the legal system).
66. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 158 (1992).
67. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
68. Fleming, 120 F.3d at 246 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th
Cir. 1997)); see also Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enter., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an employer is liable where it “either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment [of a
third party] by not taking immediate and/or corrective action when it knew or should have known of
the conduct”).
69. See Garmager, supra note 7, at 1077–80 (noting that the unique political and regional battle in
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Supreme Court has never confronted the issue.70 As a result, lower
federal courts have struggled to locate the geographical limits of
employer liability for harassment of employees.71 When determining
whether a hostile workplace exists, the federal circuit courts are split as
to whether the totality of the circumstances test contemplates harassment
that occurs after hours or outside the walls of the workplace.72
A.

Several Courts Have Considered Evidence of Harassment Outside
the Workplace As Part of the Totality of the Circumstances When
Reviewing a Hostile Work Environment Claim

The First,73 Second,74 Seventh,75 and Eighth76 Circuit Courts of
Appeals have expressly indicated that harassment conducted outside the
physical walls of the workplace is part of the totality of the
circumstances for purposes of a hostile work environment claim. These
courts have not clearly defined what harassment beyond the office’s
“four walls” should be considered; however, they have paid particular
attention to whether the harassing conduct can be properly characterized
as part of the employee’s work environment.77
For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district
court’s consideration of conduct outside the workplace in a hostile work
environment claim in Crowley v. L.L Bean, Inc.78 In Crowley, the
plaintiff claimed that she was improperly touched and stalked by a coemployee.79 The plaintiff further alleged that the co-employee engaged
in a number of harassing actions including grabbing her foot and
Congress caused the remedial purpose of ending workplace harassment to never fully develop
within the legislature).
70. See id. at 1083.
71. See id. at 1083–91 (outlining current case law in the area of employer liability for conduct
outside the workplace).
72. Id.
73. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002).
74. Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704,
715 (7th Cir. 2006).
76. Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2001).
77. See, e.g., Lapka, 517 F.3d at 983 (noting that employer-sponsored training program where
employer paid for accommodations and food could qualify as part of the employee’s work
environment); Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135 (examining employer’s connection to hotel room where
harassment took place to determine whether it can be characterized as part of the employee’s work
environment).
78. 303 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 392.
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massaging it against her will at a company-sponsored pool party,
continually following her at work, physically blocking her path and
thereby forcing her to squeeze by him, giving her gifts designed to let
her know that he was watching her, following her home, and even
breaking into her home.80 The defendant claimed that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of this non-workplace
conduct.81 The First Circuit reasoned, however, that the work
environment is not limited to the four walls of the office.82 The court
determined that the defendant’s conduct outside the workplace walls,
including harassment conducted at the company-sponsored pool party
and in a non-workplace parking lot, explained why the defendant’s
“constant presence around [the plaintiff] at work created a hostile
environment.”83 The evidence of non-workplace conduct also helped to
establish whether the hostility in the workplace was severe and
pervasive, as well as to establish that the conduct was motivated by
gender.84
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also confronted the issue of
harassment outside the workplace in Lapka v. Chertoff.85 The hostile
work environment claim in Lapka stemmed from an alleged rape by a
fellow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employee, which
occurred while the plaintiff was attending a mandatory month-long
professional training course.86 According to DHS, the rape was not
evidence of workplace harassment because the incident occurred in a
private hotel room in the context of after-work socializing.87 Rejecting
this argument, the court noted that conduct supporting a harassment
claim does not have to take place exclusively within the physical
confines of the workplace.88 The court further pointed out that the
training facility at issue was different from a typical workplace where
“employees go home at the close of their normal workday.”89 Although
the harassment occurred outside the office, the training was an
employer-sponsored function where the employer provided
80. Id.
81. Id. at 409.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 409–10.
84. See id. at 409.
85. 517 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2008).
86. Id. at 979.
87. Id. at 983.
88. Id. (citing Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2006)).
89. Id. (quoting Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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accommodations and meals.90 In this type of situation, the employer
should know that employees are likely to socialize and interact after
formal working hours as a matter of course.91 Based on these
circumstances, the court determined that the alleged harassment
occurred in a location constituting a continuation of the workplace
environment.92
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferris v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.93 also focused on the employer’s connection to the site of the
harassment in holding that a hotel room could form part of an
employee’s work environment within the terms of Title VII.94 In Ferris,
a female flight attendant brought a hostile work environment action
against her employer, Delta Airlines, claiming negligent supervision of a
male flight attendant who allegedly raped her during a layover in
Rome.95 The district court determined that the hotel room was not part of
the employee’s work environment because she voluntarily associated
with her co-worker and there was no evidence that Delta affirmatively
encouraged employees to visit each other’s rooms.96 The Second Circuit
reversed, noting that although the employer did not direct its employees
how to spend their off-duty hours, the circumstances of the employment
relationship dictated that crew members would most likely band together
during layovers to socialize.97 The court also acknowledged that the
airline arranged, funded, and provided ground transportation to the
attendants’ hotel accommodations.98 Based on the employer’s
connection to the hotel room, a jury could properly find that the hotel
room was part of the plaintiff’s work environment within the terms of
Title VII.99
Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not thoroughly
explained why evidence of harassment that occurs outside the workplace
can be considered in a hostile work environment claim, several of its
cases generally support this proposition. For example, in Moring v.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. (noting that “Lapka first encountered Garcia on the [training] campus, so the event
could be said to have grown out of the workplace environment”).
93. 277 F.3d 128.
94. See id. at 135.
95. Id. at 131–32.
96. Id. at 134–35.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Arkansas Department of Correction,100 employee Sherry Moring filed a
§ 1983 action against her supervisor, Gary Smith, for sexual
harassment.101 Moring alleged that on an overnight business trip, her
supervisor initiated a sexual conversation and later appeared barely
clothed at her hotel room door, sat on her bed, touched her thigh, and
attempted to kiss her.102 Although the court did not explicitly discuss the
fact that this incident occurred outside the workplace, the court
nevertheless found that a reasonable jury could find a hostile work
environment.103 Similarly, in Dowd v. United Steelworkers of
America,104 the Eighth Circuit, citing Moring, recognized that
harassment need not transpire in the workplace to support a hostile work
environment claim.105 The court stated that the harassment at issue was
“in physical proximity to the plant [where the plaintiff worked], and,
arguably, perpetrated with the intention to intimidate and to affect the
working atmosphere inside the plant.”106
The First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all considered
harassment outside the four walls of the workplace as part of a Title VII
hostile work environment claim. In so doing, they have focused on the
employer’s connection to the location where the harassment took place.
When the employer places the plaintiff in the extra-office location as
part of his or her work or should anticipate that employees will interact
socially in that location, the location may qualify as an extension of the
employee’s work environment.
B.

Several Courts Have Barred Consideration of Harassment Outside
the Physical Walls of the Workplace as Part of a Hostile Work
Environment Claim

While many courts consider harassment outside the workplace as part
of a Title VII claim, several federal appellate courts have categorically
excluded evidence of extra-office harassment in reviewing a hostile
work environment claim.107 In Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,108 for
100. 243 F.3d 452 (8th Cir. 2001).
101. Id. at 454.
102. Id. at 456.
103. See id. at 456–57.
104. 253 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2001).
105. Id. at 1102 (citing Moring v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 243 F.3d 452 (8th Cir. 2002)).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 815 (declining to consider behavior occurring outside of the workplace because “a
harassment claim, to be cognizable, must affect a person’s working environment”); Sprague v.
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example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered five separate
incidents of alleged harassment by the plaintiff’s supervisor over a
period of sixteen months.109 The most serious incident, according to the
court, occurred at the plaintiff’s wedding reception when the supervisor
looked down the plaintiff’s shirt and said, “well, you got to get it when
you can.”110 The court refused to consider the conduct at the wedding,
however, because the harassment “occurred at a private club, not in the
workplace.”111 The court did not articulate any reasoning for
categorically excluding any conduct occurring outside the office.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to consider
evidence of harassment outside the boundaries of the workplace. In
Gowesky v. Singing River Hospital Systems,112 the court reviewed a
disability harassment claim in which the plaintiff, an emergency room
physician, contracted Hepatitis C while treating a patient.113 According
to the plaintiff, the hospital intimidated her when she attempted to return
to work and required her to present a full medical release from her
physician, take refresher courses, and submit to weekly blood samples as
a condition of returning to work.114 While noting that the alleged
harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
plaintiff’s work environment, the court emphasized that all of the
challenged conduct occurred either over the phone or in writing while
the plaintiff was on leave from work.115 The court further noted it was
“not inclined to extend this judicially created harassment action to
behavior that occurred when the [plaintiff] was not actually working.”116
Thus, the circuits are split as to whether conduct that occurs outside
the walls of the workplace forms part of the totality of the circumstances
in a hostile work environment claim. Those courts that have considered
conduct outside the traditional walls of the workplace under the totality
of the circumstances have focused on whether the location where the
conduct occurred forms an extension of the employee’s work
environment. In recent years, technological advances have blurred the
Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
108. 129 F.3d 1355.
109. Id. at 1365.
110. Id. at 1366.
111. Id.
112. 321 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2003).
113. Id. at 506–07.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 510–11.
116. Id. at 511.
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boundaries of the workplace, further complicating the courts’ analysis of
what constitutes workplace harassment.
III. THE PROLIFERATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA HAS OPENED
THE DOOR FOR NEW FORMS OF WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT
When social media117 and the internet first emerged, many dismissed
them as a passing fad limited to facilitating gossip.118 Today, however,
few would deny that social media has become a powerful
communication tool that has fundamentally shifted the way people
communicate.119 Employers and employees increasingly utilize social
media and social networking sites, both at home and in the workplace.120
Furthermore, when using social media, many users convey intimate and
personal details of their daily lives.121
A.

Social Media Is a Broad Term

Social media is a term that encompasses several different types of
communication tools. For example, social media can be further broken
down into six distinct categories: collaborative projects,122 blogs,123
117. For purposes of this Comment, social media will be defined broadly as any internet-based
application which allows people to create and exchange user-generated content. Andreas Kaplan &
Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media,
53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010) (defining social media).
118. See, e.g., Joseph Rago, Editorial, The Blog Mob, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2006, at A.18
(describing blogs as “written by fools to be read by imbeciles”); Clifford Stoll, Editorial, The
Internet? Bah!, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1995, at 41 (arguing that online databases are too clunky to be
universally embraced and that computer networks would never change the way government or
business operates).
119. See infra Part III.B–C.
120. Gely, supra note 4, at 301–03 (discussing employees’ increasing use of the internet); see
also infra Part III.B–C.
121. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149–59 (2009) (noting that
a fully filled-out Facebook profile contains about forty different pieces of personal information,
including highly sensitive matters like political and religious views, sexual preference, relationship
status, and personal pictures); see also Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a
Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2007) (describing that a social network profile can
consist of a user’s name, country, zip code, gender, date of birth, a list of friends, a list of groups
with shared interests, pictures, videos, links to internet pages, as well as updates on daily activities).
122. See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 117, at 62 (describing collaborative projects, for
example, Wikipedia, as a platform that enables the joint and simultaneous creation of content by
many users).
123. See id. at 63 (defining blogs as special types of websites that usually display personal datestamped text entries and allow other users to add additional comments).
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content communities,124 social networking sites,125 virtual game
worlds,126 and virtual social worlds.127
Among the various categories of social media, social networking sites
have proved the most popular forum for sexual harassment and have
developed a distinct definition. Social scientists Danah Boyd and Nicole
Ellison describe social networking sites as “web-based services that
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a
bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and
those made by others within the system.”128 Broadly speaking, social
networking sites allow users to establish relationships with other users
based on a unique online identity.129 Social media allows users to
connect with previously established friends and also build new
relationships based on common interests,130 thereby providing an
alternative technological platform for standard social communication
and interaction.131
B.

Social Media, Especially Social Networking Sites, Are Rapidly
Proliferating

Social media is quickly becoming the medium of choice for
communication.132 Three out of four Americans use social media133 and
124. See id. (describing that the main objective of content communities is to share media content
between users, and such communities exist for a wide range of media types, including text (e.g.,
BookCrossing), photos (e.g., Flickr), videos (e.g., YouTube), and PowerPoint presentations (e.g.,
Slideshare)).
125. See id. at 63–64.
126. See id. at 64 (describing virtual worlds as platforms that allow users to create personal
avatars and interact with others user created avatars (e.g., World of Warcraft)).
127. See id. (describing virtual social worlds as platforms that allow users to live a virtual life
with user created avatars similar to their real life (e.g., Second Life)).
128. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2007)).
129. Grimmelmann, supra note 121, at 1143.
130. John S. Wilson, Comment, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1220 (2007) (describing how people can connect with
friends and expand their friend network by joining social networking groups based on shared
interests).
131. See id. at 1219–20 (commenting that where members of the community used to gather
around the soda fountain to talk about the local news, gossip, and the weather, they are now simply
engaging in the same conversations on social networking sites).
132. See JOSH BERNOFF, THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION (Forrester Research
2008) (finding increasing growth among individuals joining, commenting, and creating social
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millions more are members of social networking sites.134 The first social
networking sites surfaced in the late 1990s, but it was not until the mid2000s that these sites gained mainstream recognition.135 The most
popular social networking site, Facebook, has over 800 million active
users136 worldwide.137 These users include roughly sixty percent of the
American internet population.138 In addition to the number of people
using social media, the amount of time spent on social media and the
amount of information exchanged have also grown exponentially.139 In
2010, Americans spent nearly a quarter of their time online on social
networks and blogs, a roughly forty percent increase from the year
before.140 In fact, the time spent on social networks has surpassed time
spent on e-mail communications.141
As the number of social media users has increased, the type of users
has also changed. While social media originally catered to a younger
audience, over time the user population has become older and more
diverse.142 Although social media use has grown dramatically across all
age groups, recent growth among older users has been especially
noticeable.143 A recent study found that the number of social media users
media).
133. Id.
134. See Jenna Wortham, Facebook Tops 500 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at B8;
see also What is Twitter?, TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/basics/what-is-twitter/ (last visited
Jan. 7, 2012) (noting that there are over 100 million active Twitter users); About Us, LINKEDIN,
http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (noting over 135 million LinkedIn users).
135. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 128, at 214–18 (tracing the rise and fall of social networks
in the late 1990s until they attained mainstream recognition around 2003).
136. Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=204519362916669 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2012) (defining “user” as someone who has engaged with, viewed, or consumed content
generated on a Facebook page).
137. See Wortham, supra note 134.
138. Hiroko Tabuchi, Slow Growth in Japanese Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at B1.
139. See Led by Facebook, Twitter, Global Time Spent on Social Media Sites up 82% Year over
Year, NIELSENWIRE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/led-by-facebooktwitter-global-time-spent-on-social-media-sites-up-82-year-over-year (noting that global consumers
spend an average of five and a half hours a month on social networking sites alone, an increase of
eighty-two percent from the same month a year earlier)
140. What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity, NIELSENWIRE
(Aug. 2, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/what-americans-do-onlinesocial-media-and-games-dominate-activity.
141. Teddy Wayne, Social Networks Eclipse E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at B3.
142. See Social Networking’s New Global Footprint, NIELSENWIRE (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/social-networking-new-global-footprint (noting that the
fastest growth among Facebook users in 2007 to 2008 came from adults 35 to 49, not teenagers).
143. Mary Madden, Older Adults and Social Media, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Aug.
27, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Older-Adults-and-Social-

14 - WLR March 2012 Gelms Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

3/15/2012 12:10 PM

HIGH-TECH HARASSMENT

267

over the age of fifty nearly doubled between 2009 and 2010.144 Social
media use among professional workers has also increased
dramatically.145 A 2010 study found that 86% of financial professionals
had a business or personal account on one or more social media
platforms, a 13% increase in just one year.146 Thus, a broader spectrum
of society is using social media than ever before.
C.

Employers Are Actively Incorporating Social Media into Their
Business Practices

Companies are responding to the continuing growth in social
media.147 For example, employers are increasingly turning to social
media as a means to screen job applicants.148 Employers have also
recognized that the real-time nature of social media provides new
avenues for marketing, research and development, knowledge
management, and branding.149 Many companies are now recruiting
Media/Report/Findings.aspx (finding that while social media use has grown dramatically across all
age groups, older users have increasingly embraced social networking tools. Forty-seven percent of
internet users age 50 to 64 and 26% of users 65 years and older used social networking sites in
2010).
144. See id. (finding social networking use among users 50 years and older increased from 22%
to 42%).
145. Laura Kouri & Jennifer Sussman, Financial Professionals Social Media Adoption Study,
AM. CENTURY INVESTMENTS (Jan. 2011),
https://www.americancentury.com/pdf/Financial_Professionals_Social_Media_Adoption_Study.pdf
(finding that over half of the financial professionals surveyed used social media several times a
week and nearly a quarter used social media daily).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 4 (noting that companies have recognized new ways to reach
consumers by targeting social networks). For example, while Starbucks gets 1.8 million visitors to
its website every month, and Coca-Cola gets 270,000, their Facebook pages get roughly ten times
the traffic each month at 19.4 million and 22.5 million, respectively. Id. See also Nicola Clark,
Airlines Follow Passengers onto Social Media Sites, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/business/global/30tweetair.html (noting that airline companies
have targeted social media “as a low-cost public relations and marketing tool, in particular to spread
the word about fare sales or to make announcements about new routes or services”).
148. See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2011, at B1 (describing a company that conducts social media background checks for
employers and noting that seventy-five percent of recruiters are required by their companies to
conduct online research of applicants).
149. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 147; Lee Dong-Hun, Growing Popularity of Social Media and
Business Strategy, 3 SERI Q. 112, 113–16 (stating that companies have turned to social media for
marketing and branding purposes because of its speed, durability, diverse users, reduced costs, and
its perceived improvement at addressing customer concerns); see also Geoffrey Fowler, Are You
Talking to Me?: Yes, Thanks to Social Media. And the Best Companies Are Listening, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 25, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576263083970961862.html (noting that
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employees specifically to monitor and grow their social media
presence.150 A recent study found that 23% of Fortune 500 companies
have blogs, 62% have corporate Twitter accounts, and 58% have
corporate Facebook profiles.151 Social media is even more prominent
among the fastest-growing private companies in the United States, which
are known as the Inc. 500.152 Eighty-three percent of Inc. 500 companies
utilize at least one form of social media.153 Fifty percent of them have
blogs, 59% have corporate Twitter accounts, and 71% have a corporate
Facebook profile.154 Overall, companies have recognized that a social
media presence is an important part of their business and marketing
strategy.
Companies have also embraced social media as a low-cost
communication channel, which allows employees to interact beyond the
boundaries of the traditional work site.155 The increase in work outside
the office, however, has further blurred the boundary between work and
home, public and private.156 With the increased use of social media
among individuals and companies, incidents of social media harassment
have begun to emerge.157 Therefore, while companies have turned to
companies are embracing social media as a two-way communication tool with consumers for
marketing and advertising).
150. See The State of Social Media Jobs 2010 – A Special Report, SOC. MEDIA INFLUENCE (June
14,
2010),
http://socialmediainfluence.com/2010/06/14/the-state-of-social-media-jobs-2010-aspecial-report (noting that 59 of the global 100 were “recruiting staff specifically assigned to core
social media duties that include customer outreach, PR and marketing support and internal
communications”).
151. Nora Ganim Barnes & Justina Andonian, The 2011 Fortune 500 and Social Media
Adoption: Have America’s Largest Companies Reached a Social Media Plateau?, U. MASS.
DARTMOUTH CENTER FOR MARKETING RES. (Oct. 2011),
http://www.umassd.edu/cmr/studiesandresearch/2011fortune500.
152. See Nora Ganim Barnes, The 2010 Inc. 500 Update: Most Blog, Friend and Tweet but Some
Industries Still Shun Social Media, U. MASS. DARTMOUTH CENTER FOR MARKETING RES. (Jan.
2011), http://www.umassd.edu/cmr/studiesandresearch/industriesstillshunsocialmedia (noting the
Inc. 500 list is composed of the fastest-growing private companies in the United States, while the
Fortune 500 is based on total revenue (not growth) and includes both public and private companies).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Gely, supra note 4, at 302.
156. Patricia Findlay & Alan McKinlay, Surveillance, Electronic Communications Technologies
and Regulation, 34 INDUS. REL. J. 305, 307 (2003) (stating that the changing nature of work,
primarily because people are working longer hours and working from home on computers and
programs owned by their employer, is blurring the boundary between work and home as well as
between public and private life); Rob Pegoraro, Friend? Not? It’s One or the Other, WASH. POST,
July 19, 2007, at D1 (stating the rise in the use of social networking sites by businesses has resulted
in workers having difficulty differentiating between private and professional personas).
157. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 496–503; see also Judy Greenwald, Sexual Harassment
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social media as a way to both increase their business presence and
reduce internal communication costs, there has been the consequence of
increased social media harassment.
IV. COURTS’ EXPANSIVE VIEW OF THE WORKPLACE
SUGGESTS THAT EMPLOYERS MAY BE LIABLE FOR
HARASSMENT VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
Some federal circuit courts have started to recognize the permeable
boundaries of the modern work place, as evidenced by their
consideration of harassment outside the four walls of the workplace
under the totality of the circumstances test of a hostile work environment
claim. Courts have already established that in some instances offpremises events such as meetings, business trips, and employersponsored social events can be considered under the totality of the
circumstances because these settings can properly be characterized as an
extension of the employee’s work environment. As social media
becomes increasingly entangled with individuals’ professional lives,
courts may consider certain social media communications part of the
totality of the circumstances test for purposes of a Title VII hostile work
environment claim.
A.

Courts Confronting Social Media Harassment Have Considered It
as Part of the Totality of the Circumstances in a Hostile Work
Environment Claim

Although social media and social networking sites are not new forms
of communication, their legal implications are just now coming into
focus.158 While several cases have addressed hostile work environment
Remains
Major
Workplace
Problem,
BUS.
INS.
(Dec.
11,
2011),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20111211/NEWS07/312119984
(explaining
that
harassment is still prevalent within the workplace and that social media enables people to harass
others without even seeing or touching them).
158. See, e.g., Kendall K. Hayden, The Proof Is in the Posting: How Social Media Is Changing
the Law, 73 TEX. B.J. 188 (2010) (outlining social media’s impact in the areas of family law,
constitutional law, and criminal law); Brian D. Wright, Social Media and Marketing: Exploring the
Legal Pitfalls of User-Generated Content, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 67 (2010) (examining the legal
implications of social media marketing campaigns); see also Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (examining whether school suspension for creating a social networking site group
expressing dislike for a teacher violated the student’s First Amendment rights); EEOC v. Simply
Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435–36 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (examining scope of discovery of
plaintiff’s social networking sites for purposes of determining mental state); Yath v. Fairview
Clinic, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42–45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (examining potential privacy violation
for data posted on Facebook that contained information from patient’s medical file).
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claims stemming from other forms of electronic communication,
especially e-mail, there are few addressing claims based on social media
communications.159
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Blakey v. Continental Airlines,
Inc.160 was one of the first courts to consider whether an employer is
responsible for preventing employee harassment over social media.161 In
Blakey, an airline employee filed a hostile work environment claim
arising from allegedly defamatory statements published by co-workers
on her employer’s electronic bulletin board.162 The electronic bulletin
board, known as the Crew Member Forum, was not maintained by the
employer but was accessible to all Continental pilots and crew
members.163 Employees were also required to access the Forum to learn
their flight schedules and assignments.164
The Court analyzed the case under a traditional hostile work
environment framework, concluding that the electronic bulletin board
was no different from other social settings in which co-workers might
interact.165 Although the electronic bulletin board was not part of the
physical workplace, the employer had a duty to correct harassment
occurring there if the employer obtained a sufficient benefit from the
electronic forum as to make it part of the “workplace.”166 Accordingly,
the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the
company “derived a substantial workplace benefit” from the bulletin
board and whether the bulletin board “should be considered sufficiently
integrated with the workplace to require” the employer to take steps to
prevent the offensive conduct.167 The court made clear that an employer
159. See, e.g., Ott v. Airtran Holdings. Inc., No. 06-C-0371, 2010 WL 1368778, at *7–8 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that briefly seeing images of naked women on computer screens is
insufficient support of a hostile work environment claim); Hoffman v. Lincoln Life & Annuity
Distribs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375–76 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that evidence of twelve obscene
e-mail messages over a period of seventeen months was not severe or pervasive enough to support a
hostile work environment claim); Curtis v. DiMaio, 46 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (E.D. N.Y. 1999),
aff’d, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding a single ethnically and racially insensitive e-mail
forwarded to a number of colleagues within the workplace was not grounds for an actionable
harassment claim).
160. 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
161. See Michele A. Higgins, Note, Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.: Sexual Harassment in
the New Millennium, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 155, 159 (2002).
162. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543–44.
163. Id. at 544.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 549.
166. Id. at 551.
167. Id.
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does not have an affirmative duty to monitor the forum, but that liability
may nevertheless attach if the company had direct or constructive
knowledge of the content posted there.168 The court therefore limited
consideration of social media harassment to situations where the
employer derived a benefit from the forum and it could therefore be
considered part of the employee’s work environment.
The District Court of Puerto Rico in Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Services,
Inc.,169 also considered evidence of social media harassment as part of a
hostile work environment claim. In Amira-Jabbar, the plaintiff alleged
that her employer discriminated and retaliated against her because of her
race.170 After a company-approved golf outing, a co-worker uploaded
pictures, including one featuring the plaintiff, on Facebook.171 On the
comments section of the social networking site, a co-worker wrote a
racially derogatory comment.172 The plaintiff sued her employer on a
hostile work environment theory, claiming that the comments
constituted racially motivated harassment that the employer did not
adequately remedy.173
The Amira-Jabbar court found the social media harassment
sufficiently work-related to be included under the totality of the
circumstances.174 The court did not explain, however, why these
comments were sufficiently work-related. Although the court considered
the social media evidence, it found the comments were offhand and
isolated and thus insufficient to create a hostile work environment.175
Moreover, even if the harassment had been severe or pervasive, the court
determined that the employer had proven an affirmative defense to
liability by immediately blocking access to Facebook on all company
computers after the incident occurred.176 As a result, the plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim was dismissed with prejudice.177
Nevertheless, the court’s analysis suggests that evidence of social media
harassment can form part of the totality of the circumstances in a hostile

168. See id. at 552.
169. 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010).
170. Id. at 82.
171. Id. at 81.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 82.
174. See id. at 85–86.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 86–87.
177. Id. at 87.
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work environment claim.178
Blakey and Amira-Jabbar both indicate that courts may consider
evidence of harassment over social media as part of the totality of the
circumstances of a hostile work environment. However, while the court
in Amira-Jabbar considered only whether the social media harassment
could be characterized as work-related, the Blakey court adopted a
narrower approach. Blakey indicates that courts should conduct a more
fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the social media evidence
should be considered.179 Blakey specifically focused on the benefits the
employer received from the social media forum to determine whether the
social media forum could be considered part of the employee’s work
environment.
V.

COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER HARASSMENT OVER
SOCIAL MEDIA AS PART OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
CLAIM IF THE SOCIAL MEDIA WAS INTEGRATED INTO
THE EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS

There is currently confusion and a dearth of case law regarding what
role evidence of social media harassment should have in a hostile work
environment claim. The lack of clear legal boundaries regarding online
communications, however, encourages harassers to engage in conduct
they might have refrained from within the walls of the workplace.180 At
the same time, the increased integration of social media within our lives
makes it likely that courts will be confronting issues of social media with
increased frequency.181
To determine whether harassment over a social media forum may
serve as evidence of a hostile work environment, courts should examine
whether the employer derived a substantial benefit from the social media
forum utilized by the harasser. If the employer derived a substantial
benefit from the social media forum, then the social media is a logical
extension of the employee’s work environment.182 In these situations,
social media harassment should be considered under the totality of the

178. See id. at 85–86.
179. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.
180. See Azy Barack, Sexual Harassment on the Internet, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 77, 82–
83 (2005) (arguing the lack of clearly defined legal guidelines and visible enforcement mechanisms
online fosters an environment that enables harassment that might not take place offline).
181. See supra Part III.B–C.
182. See Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 551–52 (N.J. 2002).
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circumstances of a Title VII hostile work environment claim for
purposes of determining employer liability.
A.

An Employer Derives a “Substantial Benefit” from Social Media if
the Employer Reduces Transaction Costs or Increases Revenue by
Using Social Media

To determine whether social media harassment should be considered
as part of a hostile work environment claim, courts should determine
whether the employer derived a substantial benefit from the social media
forum. As the court in Blakey noted, looking at whether the employer
derived a substantial benefit from the social media forum indicates
whether the social media was sufficiently integrated into the employer’s
business operations to qualify as a logical extension of the workplace.183
Courts may properly consider social media that is a logical extension of
the workplace as part of the totality of the circumstances of a hostile
work environment claim.
While the court in Blakey did not clearly articulate what constitutes a
“substantial benefit,” it did provide several examples when social media
may provide an employer benefit.184 First, the court stated that
employees’ ability to access company information via social media
constitutes a benefit because it improves efficiency.185 Second, employee
communication about company business, or working on an employersponsored activity, would likewise appear to be a benefit.186
Communication between employees over social media promotes
collaboration, spurs innovation, and reduces costs by streamlining
operations.187 Third, the number of current employees utilizing the social
media forum would be relevant in determining the employer’s benefit.188
The greater the number of employees utilizing the social media forum,
the more likely it is that the employer is receiving a benefit.189 All of
these social media benefits allow an employer to reduce internal
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 552.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Casey Hibbard, How IBM Uses Social Media to Spur Employee Innovation, SOC.
MEDIA EXAMINER (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/how-ibm-uses-socialmedia-to-spur-employee-innovation (explaining how IBM utilizes multiple internal social media
platforms where employees can work collaboratively, talk about current projects, and exchange
ideas for future projects).
188. See Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551.
189. See id.
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transaction costs.190
However, there are other benefits that can be derived by the employer
that the Blakey court did not articulate. Besides the benefits obtained by
reducing internal costs, employers also receive social media benefits
through advertising and product sales.191 These types of actions could
also indicate that the employer has integrated the social media platform
as part of its business model.
Based on the substantial benefits test, an employer could be held
liable for postings by supervisors or non-supervisors that occur on a
company-sponsored social media forum such as a Facebook group192 or
a company Facebook page.193 On a company-sponsored Facebook
group, the company may benefit by increasing employee
communication, spurring product innovation, or otherwise streamlining
operations.194 Similarly, a company’s Facebook page may benefit the
company through increased advertising or branding.195 As the court in
Blakey indicated, when the employer receives a substantial benefit from
the social media forum, it is sufficiently integrated into the workplace
such that it can be characterized as an extension of the employee’s work
environment.196 Because the social media harassment is part of the
employee’s work environment, evidence of the harassment can be
considered under the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
there was a hostile work environment.197
On the other hand, an employer would most likely not be liable for
190. See id. at 552.
191. See, e.g., TOM FUNK, SOCIAL MEDIA PLAYBOOK FOR BUSINESSES 5 (2011) (stating that Dell
Computers has had more than $3 million in sales from its @DellOutlet Twitter account); see also
Dong-Hun, supra note 149, at 115–16 (noting that companies utilize social media as a direct sales
channel and to amplify word-of-mouth about products); Amy Martinez, Retailers Piling into Twitter
Nest, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A12 (noting that companies are increasingly using social
media to advertise about company-sponsored events, new items, limited time deals or coupon
codes).
192. Groups are usually used to share information, collaborate, or organize, and they can be either
public or private. See, e.g., Rusty Weston, Facebook: Your Company’s Intranet?, FORBES, Mar. 20,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/20/facebook-intranet-serena-entrepreneurs-technologyfacebook.html (describing Serena Software’s creation of a private Facebook group page that
informs employees about company news).
193. Facebook for Business, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/business/pages (last visited
Feb. 1, 2012) (noting that Facebook allows companies to make dedicated pages for businesses,
products, or brands that can be viewed and commented on by other users); see, e.g., Starbucks
Facebook Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ Starbucks (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
194. See supra notes 149, 186–187 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 149.
196. Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 551 (N.J. 2002).
197. See supra notes 77, 88–92, 97–99 and accompanying text.
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any harassing comments posted by a supervisor or non-supervisor on an
employee’s personal Facebook page. In this situation, the employer is
likely not receiving any type of economic or personal benefit from the
Facebook page and thus the employer is not deriving a substantial
benefit.198 In this case, the social media forum could not be properly
characterized as an extension of the employee’s work environment.
Conduct that does not relate to an employee’s work environment should
not be considered under the totality of the circumstances.199
VI. THE SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS FRAMEWORK IS
CONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL EMPLOYER LIABILITY
PRINCIPLES, RECOGNIZES THE CHANGING WORKPLACE,
AND PROVIDES EMPLOYERS WITH GUIDANCE ON
MAINTAINING AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO LIABILITY
A.

The Substantial Benefits Framework Is Consistent with Agency
Principles

The substantial benefits analysis is consistent with agency principles,
which formed the foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s traditional
analysis for employer liability in hostile work environment claims. In
Faragher and Ellerth, the Court imputed liability to employers for
harassment by supervisors and non-supervisors under the aided-inagency theory.200 The employer is liable under this theory because the
agency relationship between the employer and the employee enables the
employee’s harassment of others in the workplace environment.201 In
other words, without the agency relationship (i.e., the fact that the
harasser was employed by the company) the harassing conduct could not
have been committed.202
Because the substantial benefits framework focuses on whether the
social media forum is an extension of the employee’s work environment,
it is consistent with the aided-in-agency principle. The substantial
benefits test looks at the employer’s involvement and connection with
the social media platform.203 An employee who utilizes an employersponsored social media forum to perpetrate harassment relies on his or
198. See supra notes 77, 88–92, 97–99 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 77, 88–92, 97–99 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 44–46, 52–55 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 44–46, 52–55 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 44–46, 52–55 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part V.A.
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her employment relationship to facilitate the misconduct. Thus, the
substantial benefits analysis utilizes agency principles to determine
whether the social media forum where the harassment occurred can be
properly considered to have been aided by the agency relationship.
B.

The Substantial Benefits Analysis Recognizes the Permeable
Boundaries of the Modern Workplace

The substantial benefits framework recognizes that the work
environment is no longer limited to the “four walls” of the workplace.204
Evolving technology and its acceptance within the workplace has only
further blurred these distinctions.205 The substantial benefits test
addresses the increasing role that social media plays within the work
environment.
Those courts that have included conduct outside the traditional
workplace setting as evidence of a hostile work environment have
focused on whether the forum in which the conduct occurred qualifies as
an extension of the employee’s work environment.206 For example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Lapka paid particular attention to
the employer’s connection to an off-site training program, including the
fact that the employer paid for sleeping accommodations and meals, in
determining that the harassment that occurred could be properly
characterized as an extension of the employee’s work environment.207
Likewise, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferris focused on the
employer’s role in arranging employees’ hotel accommodations in
determining that a hotel room was part of an employee’s work
environment.208 The fact that the plaintiff’s work as an airline stewardess
involved frequent stays at hotels, where employees were likely to
interact, provided additional support for this conclusion.209
The substantial benefits analysis is consistent with those courts that
have considered harassment outside the traditional “four walls” context
because it focuses on whether the social media platform can be
characterized as an extension of the employee’s work environment. By
focusing on the employer’s connection to the social media forum, the
substantial benefits analysis does not hinge on the exact location or
204. See supra note 3; Part II–III.
205. See supra note 156.
206. See supra notes 77, 88–92, 97–99 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 88–92.
208. See supra notes 97–99.
209. See supra notes 97–99.
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timing of the harassing conduct. In this way, the substantial benefits
analysis addresses the fact that technology continues to blur the
traditional boundaries of the workplace and that employers are
embracing technology as part of their business. At the same time, the
substantial benefits analysis recognizes that employers should generally
not be held liable for an employee’s purely personal social network
communications.210 Such communications are not conducted through a
channel that is part of an employer’s business211 and cannot be properly
characterized as part of the employment relationship or an extension of
the employee’s work environment.
C.

The Substantial Benefits Analysis Would Provide Employers with
Guidance on How to Maintain an Affirmative Defense to Title VII
Claims in a Social Media Age

The substantial benefits framework would provide guidance to
employers on how to shield themselves from Title VII liability for
employee harassment over social media. To raise an affirmative defense
to liability for a hostile work environment, an employer must show that
(1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the
harassment; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or remedial measures provided by the employer.212
Courts have indicated that a carefully crafted213 and implemented
anti-harassment policy is an employer’s best defense against a
harassment claim.214 An anti-harassment policy provides compelling
evidence that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any harassment.215 Because courts have failed to
210. See, e.g., Booker v. GTE.net LLC, 350 F.3d 515, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
employer not vicariously liable for highly offensive e-mail message sent through the employer’s
computer system where the messages did not advance the interests of the employer).
211. See id.
212. See supra note 57.
213. See supra notes 58–59 (indicating that in order to be carefully crafted, a policy needs to
establish what harassment is and where a victim can go to report an instance of harassment).
214. See id. But see Donald P. Harris et al., Sexual Harassment: Limiting the Affirmative Defense
in the Digital Workplace, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 73, 89–96 (2005) (advocating that affirmative
defense to harassment claim should be unavailable or significantly modified if employer fails to
utilize available technology to prevent online sexual harassment).
215. See White v. BFI Waste Serv., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[D]istribution by
an employer of an anti-harassment policy provides ‘compelling proof . . . [of] reasonable care in
preventing and promptly correcting harassment.”); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv., Inc., 347
F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (reiterating that promoting and disseminating a harassment policy
is “essential to establishing the first prong of a Faragher affirmative defense that an employer took
reasonable care in preventing sexual harassment”); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191
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articulate whether social media harassment will be considered under the
totality of the circumstances of a hostile work environment claim,
however, there has been little guidance for employers on how to
properly update their anti-harassment policies in the changing
workplace. In fact, many large publicly held companies currently
maintain vague policies or no policy at all regarding the use of social
media.216
The substantial benefits framework would encourage employers to
examine their existing technology and harassment policies to determine
whether they adequately address current technological platforms that
could be considered an extension of the employee’s work environment.
By updating their policies to include social media utilized as part of their
business, employers would indicate to courts that they have taken
reasonable care to prevent social media harassment from occurring.217
As a result, the employer would be able to maintain an affirmative
defense to liability. The substantial benefits framework provides
employers with a basis for updating their anti-harassment policies to
acknowledge that harassment is increasingly occurring over new
mediums while also enabling them to continue to have an affirmative
defense to harassment claims.
CONCLUSION
Workplace harassment, like work itself, is no longer limited to the
traditional “four walls” of the workplace. As technology and the
boundaries of the workplace have changed, courts have struggled to
modernize their framework for assessing hostile work environment
claims under Title VII. These problems will only become exacerbated as
society continues to embrace social media throughout our daily lives and
employers continue to integrate social media into their business
practices.
In order to determine whether evidence of social media harassment
F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998))
(holding that “an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedures is an important consideration in
determining whether [an] employer has satisfied” the first prong of an affirmative defense to a Title
VII harassment claim); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811–12 (7th Cir. 1999).
216. Press Release, Proskauer Rose LLP, Survey: Social Networks in the Workplace Around the
World (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.proskauer.com/news/press-releases/july-142011/more-than-75-percent-of-businesses-use-social-media-nearly-half-do-not-have-socialnetworking-policies (survey finding that forty-five percent of worldwide businesses have no social
media policy).
217. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
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conducted by supervisors or non-supervisors should be considered in a
hostile work environment claim, courts should ask whether the employer
derived a substantial benefit from the social media forum in which the
harassment took place. If the employer derived a substantial benefit, then
the social media can be properly characterized as an extension of the
employee’s work environment, and the evidence of harassment forms
part of the totality of the circumstances. This analysis is consistent with
the agency principles that are at the heart of Faragher and Ellerth,
recognizes evolving technology in the modern workplace, and would
provide employers with much needed direction for implementing antiharassment policies that will shield them from vicarious liability.

